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Data-exclusivity is one of the most controversial issues in the current discussion on pharmaceutical intellectual property 
policy-making globally. It is aimed at protecting and safeguarding pharmaceutical test data submitted by pharmaceutical 
companies to drug regulatory authorities (DRA) for the purpose of obtaining marketing approval for new drugs. Most 
countries require the submission of test data relating to the efficacy and safety of pharmaceuticals and agro-chemicals as a 
condition for grant of marketing approval. Since the marketing approval process is laborious and expensive, the originators 
of such regulatory data demand protection for their investments through exclusivity periods, separate from any patent 
protection for the active ingredient. On the other hand, generic manufacturers advocate minimal protection for such data as 
they would be able to obtain speedier marketing approvals. Data-exclusivity thus, prevents during a set period of time, a 
second pharmaceutical applicant from obtaining a marketing authorization for its drug through a facilitated procedure; this 
procedure entails reliance by the second applicant on preclinical and clinical data generated by a pioneer company that 
prepared that data to support its own new drug application. The underlying logic of data-exclusivity suggests that it is an 
expression of trade-secrets, and that as such, data-exclusivity should be independent of patents. Compared with patents, the 
market power of data-exclusivity is, in theory, less restrictive, mainly because it does not legally prevent other companies 
from generating their own registration data. However, in practice, the vast financial resources and extended time required for 
gathering and generating pharmaceutical registration data for a new drug create a market barrier that is too high for generic 
based companies. 
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Developed countries pushed very hard during the 
TRIPS negotiations to have data-exclusivity included 
in the Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS) Agreement as a new kind of intellectual 
property right (IPR). They succeeded in part, as test 
data are mentioned in Section 7 of the TRIPS 
Agreement, but not entirely, as TRIPS does not talk 
about “exclusivity” as such. Data-exclusivity traces its 
concept to Article 39.3 of the TRIPS Agreement. 
There is no unanimity in the interpretation of Article 
39.3. Presently, there are three emerging approaches 
to the interpretation of the provisions- the first that 
advocates data-exclusivity, the second that argues for 
data protection and the third that mandates a 
compensatory liability model. 
Data-exclusivity is becoming an additional form of 
IP protection for research based pharmaceutical 
companies. Companies involved in research and 
development (R&D) spend a lot of time and money 
on the discovery of new products. It is well-known 
that a major share of research and development 
expenditure of pharmaceutical companies is spent on 
generation of pre-clinical and clinical trial data for 
approval of new drug. The research data or test data 
which is generated during R&D process of new  
drug is proprietary to innovator. The Data thus 
generated is submitted to drug regulatory authorities 
as a pre- requisite for marketing approval of the new 
chemical entities (NCE). This entire process may take 
about 12-13 years. Hence effective patent life comes 
about 7-8 years or even less.  
Therefore, data protection systems, could if they 
provided exclusivity, become a partial substitute for 
patent protection, especially in countries which do not 
provide patent protection to pharmaceutical products 
or which are currently in the transitional periods  
of the TRIPS Agreement. This Article reflects upon 
pros and cons of the rationale for providing data-
exclusivity towards new-drug development. It 
provides an in-depth analysis of the concept of data-
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exclusivity and its possible interfaces with regimes to 
regulate data-protection, patents and trade secret. It 
traces origin and definition of data-exclusivity by 
providing a detailed analysis of Article 39.3 of the 
TRIPS Agreement. It aims to analyse the arguments 
for and against data-exclusivity in an objective 
manner. It highlights the issues and concerns of 
developing and least-developed countries (LDCs), 
with a specific analysis of the India’s position on the 
issue at hand. It elaborates ways towards ensuring 
public interest while granting Test-data 
Protection/Data-exclusivity. The article suggests a 
way forward for countries like India on the subject 
matter, and how best the obligations under Article 
39.3 of the TRIPS are to be carried out by developing 
countries. Optimum period for the test data to be 
reasonably excluded for generic companies has also 
been deliberated upon. As it is well recognised, before 
a medicinal product can be used on patients, extensive 
tests are required so that the efficiency, safety, 
efficacy and quality of the product can be ascertained. 
Data-exclusivity is one of the most prominent regimes 
for test data protection – as it allows limited time 
duration during which only the generator of the trial 
data has the access to the data so as to ensure 
adequate return on investment. In certain cases, it is 
seen that ‘data-exclusivity’ helps originator 
companies to recover costs made on discovering and 
developing a new drug. Without data-exclusivity, the 
cost would take longer time period to be recouped. 
Long-time slack - from advancement to 
commercialization - may not be the situation with 
each medication or organization. India is considered 
to be the capital of generic medicines over the globe 
and it is argued that a strict data-exclusivity regime 
would jeopardize this status and availability of 
generic medicines to millions of poor in developing 
countries. Many authors argue that introduction of 
data-exclusivity in pharma field, would adversely 
affect at least partially, the hitherto proven 
capabilities of Indian generic industry.1 
At present, India does not recognize data-
exclusivity provisions. It is said that data-exclusivity 
provisions, if added to the Indian Drugs and Cosmetic 
Act, will prevent India’s drug regulatory agency from 
referencing or otherwise relying on registration data 
previously innovator drug companies in order to gain 
regulatory approval for therapeutically equivalent 
generic versions. 
This article seeks to proffer a platform to enable 
engagement, in-depth examination, and critical 
analysis of the overall feasibility (and hence, the 
eventual sustainability-quotient) of one of the key 
components underpinning the existing rules that 
impact and affect the development and disbursal of 
patented medicines, i.e., the somewhat contentious 
element of “data-exclusivity.” Toward that end, we 
shall commence by contextualising data-exclusivity 
against the backdrop provided by the WTO 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights,2 before moving on to outline its 
relationship with the conventional model of patent 
protection. Thereafter, we shall briefly review the 
possible costs and benefits of introducing data-
exclusivity laws, in order to be able to appreciate the 
complex yet composite nature of the starkly 
heterogeneous global scenario, which prevails at 
present, and in the process, to hopefully arrive at a 
suitable model/proposition that countries would be 
well served to utilise; whilst negotiating bilateral trade 
agreements where such elements may well demand 
vital consideration.  
 
New Drug Development 
It is indeed a fact that the development of any new 
drug requires the undertaking of a very precisely 
detailed, meticulously phased and extensive testing 
process; first within heavily controlled laboratory 
conditions, thereafter on plants/animals/the 
environment (depending on the nature of the drug or 
chemical), and finally on human subjects; and the 
established norm per which these tests are conducted 
are, - at least in the later stages, - governed by rules 
set by the regulatory authorities, - designed to ensure 
the safety, quality, and efficacy of products being 
developed for the ultimate beneficial consumption by 
the concerned patient. There are economic, practical 
and ethical reasons why second/generic entrants into 
the pharmaceutical market should not attempt to 
reproduce the test data. The tests may take several 
years to complete and delay the entry of cheaper 
generics into the market; it will also generally be 
unethical to replicate tests on human subjects for 
products that have already demonstrated efficacy. The 
tests, particularly those involving human clinical 
trials, are relatively expensive and often require 
significant investments. 
While innovations across many industry sectors are 
driving better returns and more efficiency at lower 
costs, this is not the case with pharmaceutical drug 
development. Studies on pharmaceutical industry data 
have suggested that the average total development 




cost of a new drug is on the order of US$800 million, 
of which about 60% would be incurred in the conduct 
of trials (a substantial portion of these trials would be 
required for regulatory approval).3 Because of the size 
of the required investment in clinical test data, the 
pharmaceutical industry argues that, the use of such 
data by third parties (other than the regulatory 
authority) must be prevented. If the regulator, relying 
on test data provided by the originator company at 
great expense, allows an equivalent product to enter 
the market, originator companies would have no 
incentive to incur the heavy costs necessary to bring 
new products to market in the first place. In practical 
terms, and in light of the prohibitive financial 
investment involved in replicating the originator 
product – an exclusivity rule that prevents use of the 
data by a third party (or the regulator relying on that 
data to approve a third party’s generic product) has 
the simultaneous effect of deterring a potential 
competitor. This becomes exponentially more critical 
when applied to medicines, where, even if the cost 
were (arguably) not so very prohibitive, - there will 
additionally exist ethical concerns about repeating 
trials (that include an untreated control group) with a 
drug known to be efficacious.4 
In India, as per the Drugs and Cosmetics Act 
(DCA), 1940 which concerns the market approval  
of drugs and Insecticides Act, 1968 which deals with 
chemicals, regulatory authorities have the obligation 
to insist for the submission of valuable data signifying 
the safety and efficacy for granting market approval 
for new drugs and chemicals. The basis for this 
provision is to ensure safety and quality of the 
product. As per the existing law, we have used a 
broad definition for new drugs for regulating approval 
of drugs. This includes new chemical entities, new 
combinations, dosages and indications. Test data of 
different types are insisted for providing approval of 
all these forms. However, the rules provide discretion 
to the authority to waive the data requirements in 
cases where the drug is already marketed in other 
parts of the world or there are sufficient published 
materials to show the safety of the drug. As per the 
Rule if the drug is already in the market in any other 
part of the world, only data of confirmatory clinical 
trials need be given for granting the approval to 
market it in India for the first time. The subsequent 
manufacturer of the same product in India need to 
give only bio-equivalence and bioavailability studies 
to get the approval. The full set of clinical trials, as 
per the rules, is mandated only in case where the drug 
substance is marketed in India for the first time in the 
world. Such cases as of now are limited but may 
increase in the context of the introduction of product 
patent protection for new drugs.  
Conducting of confirmatory clinical trials and bio-
equivalence/ bioavailability studies do not involve 
much effort. Based on these rules the Authorities now 
do not insist for clinical trial data for drugs already in 
the market in some part of the world. In such cases 
only data of confirmatory trials alone is insisted. In 
case of subsequent applicant seeking market approval 
for an approved new drug the data on bio-equivalence 
and bio-availability studies alone are insisted. 
Continuing this approach seems good for the Indian 
drug manufacturers particularly the generic industry. 
In 1988, major changes were introduced in the DCA 
to regulate the granting of approval of new drugs for 
manufacture or import.5 Part X-A was added for the 
regulation of import of manufacture of new drugs 
including biological and special products. Rule 122-E 
gave a new and much wider definition of the term 
‘new drug’.6 Irrespective of the fact that the safety and 
efficacy of a drug is established in another country, 
fresh data as to its safety must be submitted in India, 
but the level of clinical trials depends on the status of 
the drug in other countries.7 
The matter, if not sufficiently unwieldy already, is 
visited with yet another layer of complexity, when 
one regards the position of developing countries that 
are either contemplating, or being obliged to 
contemplate some manner of a data-exclusivity 
regime. 
 
Data-Exclusivity: Concept and Genesis 
Data-exclusivity refers to a practice whereby, for a 
fixed period of time, drug regulatory authorities do 
not allow the registration files of an originator to be 
used to register a therapeutically equivalent generic 
version of that medicine. Data-exclusivity is an 
independent intellectual property right and should not 
be confused with the protection provided by other 
rights, especially patents. In fact, the strongest impact 
may be felt in a country where there is no patent for a 
medicine- if data-exclusivity is granted this will 
provide a monopoly for a set period. Data-exclusivity 
is one of the most controversial issues in the current 
discussion on pharmaceutical intellectual property 
policy making globally. It is aimed at protecting and 
safeguarding pharmaceutical registration files, i.e. 




data submitted by pharmaceutical companies to drug 
regulatory authorities for the purpose of obtaining 
marketing approval for new drugs. The underlying 
logic of data-exclusivity suggests that it is an 
expression of trade secrets and that as such, data-
exclusivity should be independent of patents. 
Compared with patents the, market power of data-
exclusivity is, in theory, less restrictive, mainly 
because it does not legally prevent other companies 
from generating their own registration data. However, 
in practice, the vast financial resources and extended 
time required for gathering and generating 
pharmaceutical registration data for a new drug create 
a market barrier that is too high for generic-based 
companies. 
 
Data-Exclusivity and Data-Protection 
Data-exclusivity is a transitional concept of 
protection of exclusive test data in the form of 
publicly undisclosed information which is in between 
the protection of the data in the form of trade secrets 
based on the principles of equity and good faith and 
the domain of patent protection which requires 
invention to be new, having an inventive step and 
capable of industrial application. Thus while, every 
new invention is protected by patent, the need arises 
to evaluate the situation in developing countries 
where a generic drug manufacturer may develop drug 
at a cheaper price by proving its bioequivalence with 
the drug of an innovator company. It seems that the 
concept of data-exclusivity poses a conflict of interest 
between the innovator companies who have already 
availed of the protection under patent laws and public 
interest. 
The exact definitions of data-exclusivity and data-
protection are yet to be ascertained but looking at the 
world wide usage of the terms, certain aspects can be 
laid out for both of them. Analysing the European 
Commission’s Report and Rules,8 and WHO 
recommendations,9data-exclusivity can be said to be 
relating to the time frame for which the regulatory 
agency may be prevented from relying on originator’s 
data to approve the products of potential generic 
competitors.10 It does not create any new property 
rights but prevents unfair competition. It is mostly 
protection of clinical test trial data of a new 
compound but may also be used for new uses or 
indications of an already approved entity.11 
In general terms, it refers to the protection of 
clinical test trial data of a new compound and its 
usage is mostly restricted to pharmaceutical and agro-
chemical industry; but has the potential in wide array 
of subject matters. Whereas, data protection is a more 
generic term belonging to privacy laws, where 
individual’s data is protected from unethical, 
unwarranted or unintended use. Hence, it won’t be 
wrong to claim that data-exclusivity is a subset of data 
protection. 
 
TRIPS Agreement: Article 39.3 
The scope of protection of pharmaceutical test data 
has been a contentious issue due to the public policies 
and interests involved. Notwithstanding the long 
negotiating history behind the adoption of the TRIPS 
Agreements, Article 39.3 is a relevant example of 
how WTO Member States have not succeeded in 
overcoming their differences.12 Nonetheless, WTO 
member states are aware that the TRIPS Agreement 
encompasses “minimum international standard” 
provisions, which constitute the bases for 
implementing TRIPS at national level.13 Article 39.3 
only applies if a member state imposes an obligation 
to submit data as a condition to obtain marketing 
approval of a drug, excluding those cases in which it 
is not necessary to submit such data, for instance, 
when the national authority relying on a prior 
registration given in another country grants marketing 
approval.14 Before moving on to a more detailed 
discussion, - it bears noting at the very outset that, the 
present-day debate surrounding data-exclusivity 
largely derives from differing interpretations of the 
WTO TRIPS Agreement, on the subject. The relevant 
provision, Article 39(3) reads as follows:  
“Members, when requiring, as a condition of 
approving the marketing of pharmaceutical or of 
agricultural chemical products which utilize new 
chemical entities, the submission of undisclosed test 
or other data, the origination of which involves a 
considerable effort, shall protect such data against 
unfair commercial use. In addition, Members shall 
protect such data against disclosure, except where 
necessary to protect the public, or unless steps are 
taken to ensure that the data are protected against 
unfair commercial use.” 
Now while it is indeed true that there still persist 
somewhat un-reconciled views pertaining to the 
intended import of Article 39(3) of the WTO TRIPS 
Agreement, - it is handy to bear in mind that the 
overall provision, i.e., Article 39 broadly deals with 
the task of safeguarding trade secrets, against which 




context, Article 39(3) enjoins member states with the 
following three obligations: 
a) To protect data on new chemical entities, the 
collection of which involved considerable effort, 
against unfair commercial use14 
b) To protect such data against disclosure, except 
where necessary to protect the public14 
c) To protect such data against disclosure, unless 
steps are taken to ensure that the data is protected 
against unfair commercial use14 
Now, while the first obligation is simply about 
protecting data submitted to regulatory agencies 
against unfair commercial use, the second and third 
obligations concern protecting data against disclosure 
to third parties, in the case of one or another 
exception. Although the generality of the wording 
does admittedly result in some lack of clarity about 
when disclosure would be justified by said exceptions 
(particularly in the third case),-the key point is that 
the obligation creates a presumption that the 
regulatory authority would not disclose data, without 
due reason, to a third party; The third obligation 
implies therefore, that disclosure is acceptable 
provided it can be ensured that disclosure will not 
lead to unfair commercial use, - and this is precisely 
where the proverbial plot thickens: multinational 
pharmaceutical companies have since been almost en 
masse, been in unequivocal favour of interpreting and 
using the term ‘unfair commercial use’ in a 
deliberately broad sense so as to mean and include 
data-exclusivity provision and are therefore 
demanding the enactment of the international data 
exclusivity laws, - in a concerted bid to justify and 
duly safeguard their investment of huge sums of 
money in to the protracted research and development 
processes of crucial drugs. 
It thus follows that, a data-exclusivity regime, in 
sum, relates to how long the regulatory agency may 
be prevented from relying on originator’s data to 
approve the products of potential generic competitors. 
Data-exclusivity does not relate to the question of 
disclosure to third parties and trade secrets dealt with 
in TRIPS Article 39(2) and (3), in which no time 
limits are specified. 
 
Beyond the TRIPS Agreement 
As a common practice, countries have entered into 
bilateral and multilateral treaties among themselves, 
where they have strengthened their IP regime beyond 
the TRIPS Agreement. One example for the same is 
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) Agreement, which 
mandates the member countries to provide market 
exclusivity which prohibits third parties to rely on 
clinical data as submitted by the originators, in the 
absence of approval for a period of eight years or for a 
period of five years in addition to three years of market 
access barrier. Another example is the European Union 
Data-exclusivity Union 2005, which requires 
protecting clinical data through data-exclusivity for a 
period of eleven years, which includes eight years of 
data-exclusivity, two years of market exclusivity, 
which can be extended by one year.  
The US’s Hatch-Waxman Act (formally Drug 
Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration 
Act of 1984, Public Law 98-417) provides for data-
exclusivity protection for a period of five years, and 
in the case of biologics, for a period of twelve years. 
The Article 1711 of the NAFTA Agreement also 
provides for the protection of clinical data, where the 
origination of such data involves considerable effort, 
except where the disclosure is deemed essential to 
protect the public or steps are taken to ensure 
protection of data from unfair commercial use. The 
reasonable period of protection is not less than five 
years. Treaty of Group of Three (Colombia, Mexico 
and Venezuela) also provides for similar protection 
period for commercialization of agro-components 
which use new chemical products. 
 
Data-Exclusivity and Patents  
With regard to a few salient points which very 
interestingly qualify the inter-relationship between 
data-exclusivity and the patent regime, it bears noting 
that, - once the patent period expires, or in an 
alternative scenario where a product is not covered by 
patent protection, - data-exclusivity does come into its 
own, as it were, - acting independently to delay the 
entry of any generic companies wishing to enter the 
market until the period of data-exclusivity is over; It 
may be noted though, that in most cases, the period of 
data-exclusivity may have no material effect if it is 
within the patent period, because exclusivity is 
protected by the patent.  
The data-exclusivity right is a much stronger right 
than a patent because, unlike patent law, there are no 
exceptions or flexibilities that allow governments to 
tailor the law to national circumstances; for example: 
there is no ability for governments to provide the 
equivalent of a compulsory license, or data-
exclusivity may act as a barrier to compulsory 




licensing of a patent on the same product by 
preventing marketing authorization for a compulsory 
licensee. Data-exclusivity is attractive to originator 
companies because unlike a patent, data-exclusivity is 
automatic (rather like copyright). No fees are incurred 
for application or maintenance of the right, and there 
is more limited scope than exists in patent law for 
legal challenges, which are expensive to mount and to 
defend. It is for these reasons, that pharmaceutical 
companies are, almost without exception, strong 
proponents of data-exclusivity regimes. 
 
Data-Exclusivity and Trade Secret 
Many theories approach data-exclusivity with the 
same yardstick as trade secret and the idea itself stems 
from Article 39 of TRIPS Agreement.  
a) In the course of ensuring effective protection 
against unfair competition as provided in Article 
10bis of the Paris Convention (1967), Members 
shall protect undisclosed information in 
accordance with Paragraph 2 and data submitted 
to governments or governmental agencies in 
accordance with Paragraph 3.  
b) Natural and legal persons shall have the 
possibility of preventing information lawfully 
within their control from being disclosed to, 
acquired by, or used by others without their 
consent in a manner contrary to honest 
commercial practices1 so long as such 
information: (a) is secret in the sense that it is not, 
as a body or in the precise configuration and 
assembly of its components, generally known 
among or readily accessible to persons within the 
circles that normally deal with the kind of 
information in question; (b) has commercial value 
because it is secret; and (c) has been subject to 
reasonable steps under the circumstances, by the 
person lawfully in control of the information, to 
keep it secret.  
c) Members, when requiring, as a condition of 
approving the marketing of pharmaceutical or of 
agricultural chemical products which utilize new 
chemical entities, the submission of undisclosed 
test or other data, the origination of which 
involves a considerable effort, shall protect such 
data against unfair commercial use. In addition, 
Members shall protect such data against 
disclosure, except where necessary to protect the 
public, or unless steps are taken to ensure that the 
data are protected against unfair commercial use. 15 
The provision talks about the obligation of 
protecting the data between both private parties and in 
relation to government authorities to which such 
information must be submitted. The first Paragraph of 
Article 39 describes the structure of the provision: 
undisclosed information in general is protected as 
defined in Paragraph 2 and data submitted to 
governmental authorities and agencies are protected 
as defined in Paragraph 3.16 
In common parlance, trade secret means ‘self-
generated information of commercial value kept 
secret’. It could comprise consumer profiles, list of 
customers and suppliers or may consist of information 
on distribution networks, advertising strategies or may 
include information on manufacturing processes and 
technical know-how.17 
Unlike copyrights, patents, designs and layout 
circuit designs, trade secret cannot be claimed as a 
property rights.18 The trade secret regime allows 
independent discovery/reverse engineering and its use 
by a third party. According to TRIPS, there are three 
criteria to be fulfilled to ascertain something as trade 
secret: 
a) It must not be generally known or readily 
accessible by people who normally deal with such 
type of information.  
b) It must have commercial value as a secret.  
c) The lawful owner must take reasonable steps to 
keep it secret. 
The footnote to Article 39.2 of TRIPS goes on to 
further elucidate that legal remedies should be 
available to address breach of contract, breach of 
confidence and inducement to breach, and acquisition 
of undisclosed information by third parties who knew 
or were grossly negligent in failing to know that 
acquisition was not based on honest commercial 
practices. 
Now bringing the discussion to Indian scenario, we 
see that no legislation has been enacted explicitly 
guiding either data-exclusivity or trade secret regime. 
Therefore, in case of dispute, the claimant of trade 
secret generally tries to find recourse through a breach 
of contract, a violation of a confidence, torts or 
intellectual property.  
One of the important criteria that the court has set 
with regard to claim of trade secret is that the owner 
must have made efforts to keep it a secret. The 
“quality of confidence” highlights trade secrets to be a 
legal concept.19 With sufficient effort or through 
illegal acts rivals may access trade secrets 




(confidential information). However, if the ‘trade 
secret’ or information owner proves that reasonable 
efforts were made to keep the information 
confidential, it (the information) remains a ‘trade 
secret’ and is legally protected. If, on the other hand, 
‘trade secret’ owners cannot establish reasonable 
efforts to protect confidential information, they risk 
losing the quality of confidentiality of the information 
even if its information is obtained by rivals without 
permission.20 A common knowledge, an information 
available in public domain or which can be inferred 
through some easily available information cannot be 
successfully claimed as trade secret. Hence, efforts 
made in maintaining confidentiality of an information 
is an important aspect that the Indian courts look at.21 
But in common business parlance it is also, 
pertinent to share the information with certain persons 
like employees, partners, investors etc. for running the 
business, question raise that how to burden them with 
the obligation to maintain the confidentiality. 
Generally, in such kind of business setup, non-
competition clause or confidentiality clause takes care 
of the matter. The employers put kind of negative 
covenants in the contract to restrain the other person 
from divulging the secret.22 So, it is only through 
bounding the other person by some contractual clause 
that confidentiality could be maintained. Comparing 
the scenario with that of data-exclusivity, the other 
person in this case is a governmental authority to 
whom the claimant has provided the data for 
approval. Now the important question that lies before 
us is whether, in absence of any legislation or 
contractual obligation (reference to trade secret), the 
governmental authority is bound to protect that data.  
At this point, the statement of Lord Greene in 
Saltman’s Case must be referred. Lord Greene while 
deliberating on the remedies that should be available 
when confidential information is at stake explained 
three scenarios in this context, he had submitted that 
if there is a contract and a party receives confidential 
information, then even if the contract is silent on it, 
there would be an obligation on the receiving party to 
keep the information confidential. In another situation 
when a defendant has used confidential information 
obtained directly or indirectly from a plaintiff without 
the consent, express or implied, he would be guilty of 
infringement of the plaintiff’s rights. In yet another 
situation, so long as the information was confidential, 
there would be obligations on the party receiving it 
whether or not there was an underlying contract.23 
Therefore, principles of equity do not consider any 
contract for the obligation of confidentiality to be put 
on the other party receiving the information. 
One important observation from the above 
mentioned Lord Greene’s three scenarios is that the 
receiving party’s own understanding of the nature of 
information shared with him, in the absence of any 
contractual clause or instruction. The trade secret 
jurisprudence has laid down certain points to ascertain 
the nature of the information in the absence of any 
guidelines but in the context of data-exclusivity, the 
data available with the authority is of different nature 
and different consideration. Therefore, whether the 
principles of equity can also be applied in the claim of 
data-exclusivity is a question yet to be answered. 
In the light of above discussion, it can be said that 
though data-exclusivity cannot be claimed as an 
intellectual property nonetheless some kind of 
exclusive rights can be claimed upon it. Though the 
jurisprudence on this subject matter is still in nascent 
stage but trait of information claimed under data-
exclusivity is somewhere a mix of trade secret and 
data protection. 
 
Arguments for and against Data-Exclusivity 
There are two primary positions in the ongoing 
discussions about Article 39.3. The contrasting 
positions and interpretations of Article 39.3 have been 
well documented to date, and from this 
documentation, it is evident that these prominent 
interpretations are polarized. One side of the debate is 
led by the United States, the European Union and the 
multinational pharmaceutical industry, which interpret 
Article 39.3 as requiring a standard of “data-
exclusivity” that includes preventing regulatory 
bodies of member states from relying on data 
submitted by the originator company when deciding 
whether to register a generic version of the same 
product. Many times, it is interpreted or it is forced 
upon developing countries that TRIPS Article 39.3 is 
talking about data-exclusivity, despite the fact that it 
has not mentioned about exclusivity anywhere, and it 
has not given any term for data-exclusivity. That’s 
why there is a debate whether TRIPS Agreement is 
talking about data-exclusivity or data protection. It 
basically talks about two-fold protection, protection 
against unfair commercial use and protection against 
disclosure. When it’s talking about the data it talks 
about data which companies have to generate to 
establish the quality, safety and efficacy of the drug 




doing pre-clinical and clinical trials and other 
laboratory analysis. 
Now the question is that in a Pharma value chain 
how do you finally receive a pill? There is a discovery 
of a molecule in case of the innovator product and 
after establishing that it is worth considering for 
clinical development it goes to the development phase 
and after finishing all the clinical trials, it is filed for 
the approval and then it goes for marketing after 
receiving the approval. But not all the products are 
innovator products. There are products which are 
either the exact copies of innovator products or they 
come from the incremental innovations. So, there are 
those generics or in licensed products which also 
reach the market. There is a clinical development 
component in both the cases. But in case of new drug 
there will be more phases. Generic drug is an identical 
or bioequivalent to a brand name drug. So there is no 
difference between an originator and a generic drug. 
The only difference is that the originators product is 
given a brand name because it was an innovative 
product of that company and generic company comes 
up with a replica of the originator. But as to the 
safety, strength, quality, efficacy there is no 
difference. In fact, there should not be any difference 
then only it’s called a generic drug. 
These generic drugs are substantially cheaper. So 
anything which comes at a less price can be bought 
more and can cover larger number of people. So, 
especially in larger programmers like TB, Malaria, 
HIV there is a need for a larger number of drugs 
which cannot be met by branded drugs. Even generic 
companies have to do some clinical trials in order to 
establish the safety and efficacy of the drug. Phase III 
and Phase III a, b are there as a requirement for even 
generic products. So when a company comes with a 
generic filing, it has to do clinical trials, it has to 
establish some physical data. So, it cannot be said that 
only innovator companies are going through this hard 
process of clinical trials. Now, if generic is 
equivalent, safe, high quality, then why there is this 
huge debate and why there is a need for data-
exclusivity?  
The issue here is that in those cases where the 
patent is no more or is not granted or patent has 
limited period for 20 years but it starts from the point 
when it’s applied and the development of product 
takes some 13, 14 or 15 years. So actual economic 
effected period for patent may be 5 to 4 years but 
data-exclusivity as in most of the cases is 5 years or 6 
years. It starts from the date when application is given 
approval for marketing. So it adds as a second layer of 
protection and that’s why it’s called a TRIPS-plus 
provision. So no matter you have an innovation, no 
matter its non-obvious, the innovator companies have 
second layer of protection in terms of data-
exclusivity. And that’s enough to block the 
competition from generic companies. Now think of a 
situation when there is no patent. If there is no patent 
then no generic can be launched because you have for 
the 5 years a second protection that does not allow the 
drug regulators to refer to the originators file for 
safety data because it is bound by the exclusivity. 
Suppose a product was launched on the 14th year of 
its patent life. Therefore, it had only 5 years for 
effective patent life in terms of economic terms and 
on 20th year, the patent expires. However, if data-
exclusivity is there it will continue for next one more 
year. Another issue is that why developing countries 
like China or many other countries have adopted data-
exclusivity provision when it is not a requirement 
under TRIPS? The reason is that because it is TRIPS-
plus, it is forced on countries to adopt data-
exclusivity. This is where FTA comes. There are 
many clauses in FTA which are not TRIPS 
requirement but above that it is called TRIPS-plus. 
The most important reason why China adopted data-
exclusivity is that it was not initially WTO member. 
And China in order to get that status started data-
exclusivity. 
Indian position is very clear. India does not accord 
any legal recognition to data-exclusivity. The Satwant 
Reddy Committee, which was formed to look into the 
matter whether India should go for data-exclusivity or 
not, clearly rejects the option of adopting a TRIPS-
plus data-exclusivity regime and instead proposed an 
alternative model with transition arrangements. 
With industry groups and some developed countries, 
for example, the United States and the European 
Union having argued that Article 39(3) requires 
countries to create a regime of data-exclusivity by 
way of devising a form of time-limited intellectual 
property right, -the contentions/justifications of the 
proponents of said regime may be summed up as 
follows: 
a) The test data which is submitted to the drug 
regulatory authorities to assess the quality, 
efficacy and safety of the drugs are a result of 
huge and risky investment made by the innovator 
companies, - both in terms of the time and the 




moneys invested, - and any stance to dilute the 
force of the same would arguably be anti-
competitive in the sense that it would directly 
deprive the innovator companies of their legitimate 
and reasonable profits by allowing the generic 
companies to avoid incurring expenditure on 
investments when launching the generic versions 
of patented drugs;24 
b) In light of the fact that patent protection is not 
available in all countries in equal measure,-data-
exclusivity laws at national levels are expected 
to encourage and act as an incentive for the 
innovator companies to launch innovative drugs 
even in those markets where adequate 
intellectual property protections may not 
available,24 e.g., instances where new uses of the 
existing products have been discovered, or where 
the new products in the market have been 
deemed to be lacking in terms of meeting the 
necessary threshold for patent ability, and so on 
and so forth; 
c) It has further been asserted that, multi-national 
pharmaceutical giants are of the view that without 
a national data-exclusivity law in place, developing 
countries could very well stand to lose out on 
foreign direct investment in the pharmaceutical 
sector as protection of test-data was crucial to a 
company's decision as to the final selection of 
location for clinical trials.24 
A good example of the above ethos would be the 
stance maintained among others, by the United States 
in particular, which has sought, in post-TRIPS 
negotiations, to insert the language of NAFTA on 
data-exclusivity, or even stronger provisions, in 
negotiating bilateral free-trade agreements with 
developing countries. Countries that have reached 
such agreements include Bahrain, Jordan, Morocco, 
Chile, the Dominican Republic, and the countries of 
Central America.25 It is thus, easily appreciable as to 
why there continues to exist equally cogent arguments 
in support of the validity of moving to institute a 
stringent data-exclusivity regime with specific regard 
to the pharmaceutical R&D sector, - as much as the 
contrary view. 
 
Issues and Concerns of Developing and Least-
Developed Countries (LDCs) 
On the other hand, Developing countries including 
India interpret Article 39.3 to provide certain 
minimum standards concerning ‘non-disclosure’ 
obligations, usually termed ‘data protection’ as 
opposed to ‘data-exclusivity’. This non-disclosure 
obligation allows for a ‘permissive reliance’ standard, 
leaving it open to national regulators to rely on test 
and other data submitted to them by originators for 
marketing approval of subsequent applicants.26 
Developing countries contend that a reasonable 
interpretation of “unfair commercial use” does not 
require the recognition of exclusivity rights, hence 
Article 39.3, has “left a wide room for manoeuvre for 
member countries to determine the appropriate means 
of protection.26 The position of developing countries 
was explained in the United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in 1996, in the 
following terms: 
“The protection is to be granted against ‘unfair 
commercial use’ of confidential data. This means that 
a third party could be prevented from using the 
results of tests undertaken by another company as 
background for an independent submission for 
marketing approval, if the data had been acquired 
through dishonest commercial practices. However, 
Article 39.3 does permit a national competent 
authority to rely on data in its possession to asses a 
second and further applications, relating to the same 
drug, since this would not imply unfair commercial 
use.”27 
So, there has been intense debate on whether it 
implies data-exclusivity or data protection. Developed 
countries have adopted data-exclusivity during which 
period the regulatory authority is barred from relying 
on any data submitted by the originator for approval of 
subsequent applications of the products. Developing 
countries including India adopted ‘non disclosure’ 
obligations, usually termed ‘data protection’ as 
opposed to ‘data-exclusivity’. This ‘non disclosure’ 
obligation allows for a ‘permissive reliance’ standard, 
leaving it open to national regulators to rely on test and 
other data submitted to them by originators for 
marketing approval of subsequent applicants.  
It was noticed that there was enough flexibility in 
the provisions of TRIPS Agreement for a country to 
determine appropriate means of protecting test data. 
In terms of Paragraph 4 of the Doha Declaration, the 
provisions are to be “interpreted and implemented in a 
manner supported of WTO members’ right to protect 
public health and, in particular, to promote access to 
medicines for all. Hence, the approach to be adopted 
should use the flexibilities in TRIPS Agreement, 
keeping in view the national interest of the country.  




It was realized that data requirements for 
registration of agro-chemicals differ considerably 
from those for pharmaceuticals. Several countries 
have accepted the difference and have made different 
provisions for regulating the protection of safety and 
efficacy data for the two sectors. Similarly, due to 
wide differences between pharmaceuticals and 
traditional medicines, there is a need to consider 
separate dispensation for them as well. 
In sum, Article 39.3 clearly requires some form of 
protection for test data, but does not require member 
states to grant exclusive rights. Its main purpose is not 
to prevent the use of such data by governments, but to 
prevent unfair use by competitors. The correct 
interpretation that must be given to Article 39 is quite 
clear and unambiguous at this point. TRIPS does not 
make granting of data-exclusivity rights mandatory, 
but gives the member states the freedom to choose the 
nature and extent of protection they want to offer. The 
question as to whether or not a country should 
actually grant this right to pharmaceutical companies 
is a totally separate one, and that answer must be 
arrived on its own merits is not linked to the 
interpretation of Article 39 of TRIPS.28 
Thus, focussing on the entirety of the debate 
surrounding Article 39(3), - it becomes fairly evident 
that it has largely concentrated on textual 
interpretation and how to “balance” the investments 
by innovator companies against the interests of 
generic pharmaceutical manufacturers and public 
health. Given the ambiguity regarding what the 
minimum requirements of Article 39(3) are, - various 
commentators have offered an alternative reading of 
the text, and have proposed that data-exclusivity is not 
required by Article 39(3) but that compensatory 
liability is.  
While this “alternative” textual interpretation may 
not be absolutely accurate, - it is nevertheless being 
increasingly viewed as a possible way to appease 
those member states that have traditionally been 
demanding a strict data-exclusivity regime. In practice 
however, the interpretive status-quo is not necessarily 
as water-tight at all times as one would hope for: 
India for instance, had adopted the position 
that Article 39(3) did not in fact, require that 
pharmaceutical test data be granted exclusivity for 
any period of time. However, subsequent bilateral and 
free trade agreements between the United States and 
developing countries have impressed a reading 
of Article 39(3) requiring data-exclusivity.28 
An Inter-Ministerial Committee, set up in 2004  
to decide on how to implement Article 39(3) of  
TRIPS, had tabled a number of proposals and 
recommendations, including the payment of a royalty 
to the originator of the data. These were succeeded by 
the several other exercises, such as, the Mashelkar 
Report, the Satwant Reddy Committee Report, etc. 
However, many of the proposals and recommendations 
have since run into rough weather as it has been alleged 
by several quarters that they appear to have been 
envisioned in the abstract, without having examined in-
depth, the practical implications on the market, and 
hence their long-term viability, both as an immediate 
economic tool, as well as a potential point for 
legislative bargaining / diplomatic leverage.28 The  
Table 1 lists some data-exclusivity provisions across 
the globe.29 
 
Table 1 — Data-exclusivity provisions across the globe 
Region Time duration 
United States of America 
Argentina  Law on the Confidentiality of Information 
and Products – Article 4 and 5  
Also made for protection against dishonest commercial 
use of the information which is submitted to the local 
health authority to approve new chemical entities.  
Not specified 
Bolivia Andean Community Decision 436 (2006)- 
Article 266  
Exceptions for protection –Necessity to protect the 
public or steps are taken to ensure that data is protected 
against unfair commercial use.  
Not specified 
Brazil  Law 9.279 on Industrial Property , Title V-
Crimes against Industrial Property , 
Chapter 6 – Protection against unfair 
competition- Article 195  
A crime of unfair competition is committed by someone 
who divulges, exploits or uses, in the absence of 
authorization, the result of tests or other undisclosed data 
the elaboration of which involved considerable effort and 
which has been presented to government entities as a 
condition for approving the commercialization of products.
Not specified 
Canada  Food and Drugs Regulations, Section 
C.08.004.1 
After the day on which the first notice of compliance was 
issued to the innovator in respect of the innovative drug. 
8 years 
(Contd.)




Table 1 — Data-exclusivity provisions across the globe  (Contd.) 
Region Time duration 
Colombia  Data Protection Decree no.2085  
Andean Community Decision 436 (2006)- 
Article 266 
Three years counted from the market approval for the 
applications presented during the first year of the decree 
in force  
Four years counted from the market approval for the 
applications presented during the second year of the 
decree in force. 
5 years 
Mexico  Industrial Property Law (Article 86bis)  
Article 1711 NAFTA(Trade secrets) 
Except where the disclosure is deemed essential to 
protect the public or steps are taken to ensure protection 
of data from unfair commercial use. The reasonable 
period of protection is not less than five years. 
5 years 
United States  Federal Food, Drug or Cosmetic Act , 
Section 505 (21.USC.355)(C)(3)(F) 
Public Health Service Act , Section 351  
US freedom of Information Act (Section 
552 (b)(4) of title 5)  
The standard used to determine misappropriation of 
undisclosed information in the United States, is whether 
the information has been appropriated through 
inappropriate means. 
A trade secret which is private or confidential is an 
exception from requirements of disclosure. 




Economic Area  
Article 13(4) Regulation (EEC)  
Article 14.11 of Regulation 726 /2004 and  
Article 10.1 and 10.5 of Directive 2001/83 
Eight years of data-exclusivity with two years of 
marketing, which can be further extended by one year, 
provided that during the first eight years of the ten years , 
the innovator has obtained authorization for one or more 
therapeutic indication.  
10 years 
Switzerland  Decree on Medications- Section 3,  
Article 17  
Application for approval of a medicine that is essentially 
same as an already approved medicine.  
In case of a new indication, time is three years.  
10 years 
Turkey  Regulations on licensing the Human 
Medical Products – Article 9 – Abbreviated 
license 
Limited to the patent period of the molecule in Turkey  6 years 
Ukraine  The law of Ukraine- On Amending Article 
9 of the of the Law of Ukraine  
“on medicines”  
Protection from disclosure and prevention from 
commercial use in bad faith. 
5 years 
Africa/ Middle East 
Egypt  Intellectual property Law no. 82  
(Article 55-62) 
Undisclosed information is protected to information 
which results from significant efforts and which is 
presented to the concerned authorities on being requested 
to permit the marketing of the pharmaceutical chemical 
or agricultural products which use new chemical entities 
necessary for needed examinations for its marketing.  
5 years 
Iraq  Coalition Provisional Authority  
Order no. 81, “Patent, Industrial Design, 
Undisclosed Information, Integrated 
Circuits and Plant Variety Law.” 
The protection of data from disclosure with the exception 
to the following  
a) Protection of public 
b) Precautions to guarantee unclassified commercial use 
of data.  
5 years 
Bahrain  Law no.(7) of the Year 2003 on trade 
secrets  
Disclosure of information is prohibited in the following 
cases – a) when the information is confidential; b) it is of 
commercial value to the confidentiality; c) if the 
confidentiality was dependable on the effective measures 
undertaken by its legal holder to preserve it.  
5 years 
Jordon  Article(8) Trade Secrets and Unfair 
Competition Law no.15(2000)  
Protection of data except in the following cases – 
a) protection of public 
b) where the competent authority has taken necessary 
steps to ensure that the data is protected against unfair 
commercial use.  
5 years 
(Contd.)




Table 1 — Data-exclusivity provisions across the globe  (Contd.) 
Region Time duration 
Morocco  Article 15.10: Measures related to a certain 
regulated products  
Five years for pharmaceutical products  
Ten years for agricultural chemical products  
5 years 
Saudi Arabia  Decision no. 3218 : Regulations for the 
protection of confidential commercial 
information , later amended by decision 
no. 4315 of 2005  
Should be a result of substantial efforts, as a precondition 
for approving the marketing of products or chemical 
agricultural products in which new chemical substances 




Decree No. 404/2000  Period for protection of data secrecy shall be period of 
validity of the patent over the original drug in the country 
of origin.  
Not Specified 
Asia/Pacific Rim 
Vietnam Intellectual Property Law, 
Article 128  
Should involve considerable effort and expenses. 
Protection from unfair commercial usage and disclosure 
Exception- Protection of public  
5 years 
Taiwan  Pharmaceuticals Affairs Law,  
Article 40  
Data-exclusivity for new indication with international 
data is immediate.  
3 years (for those with international data) and 5 years 
(for those with domestic clinical trials)  
5 years 
Singapore  Medicines Act (Chapter 176)  The licensing authority may not, for a period of 5 years 
from the date of such grant, grant a product licence to 
another person in respect of that or a similar medicinal 
product on the basis of the grant of the earlier licence 
unless the holder of the earlier licence has given his 
consent to the grant on that basis. 
5 years 
Korea  Pharmaceuticals Affairs Law New drugs, ethical drugs from already licensed drugs to 
be re-examined in 6 years and ethical drugs which are 
identical to the already licensed drugs and any other 
drugs which the minister considers necessary to be re-
examined , the period is 4 years.  
4 or 6 years 
Australia  Therapeutic Goods Act, 1989  While evaluating therapeutic goods for registration, 
protected information should not be used for evaluation.  
5 years 
China  Decree of State Council no.360 
(Regulations for implementation of  
the Drug Administration Law of the 
People’s Republic of China)  
Also ensures compliance with  
Article 39.3 of TRIPS Agreement.  
Can only be disclosed in case of public need or when 
steps are taken to ensure that the data is protected against 
unfair commercial use. 
 
6 years 
Hong Kong  Pharmacy and Poisons Regulations, 
Ordinance Cap 138  
Undisclosed documentation submitted by the manufacturer 
as support for registration is not referred to or relied upon. 
In case of generic products, if the innovative product has 
been registered for 5 or more than 5 years, clinical data is 
not required. 
Not specified 
Japan Medical Devices, Article 14-4 8 years is the re-examination period assigned for 
medicinal products with active new ingredients.  
8 years 
Malaysia  Regulation 29 of the control of the drugs 
and cosmetics regulations 1984  
The period of data-exclusivity is 5 years for a new 
product containing new ingredients and 3 years for a new 
variation of a registered product.  
Exceptions for data-exclusivity – Ensuring public health, 
national security, national emergency, non-commercial 
public use, and any emergency as declared by the 
government.  
5 years 
New Zealand  Medicines Act, 1981 no.118  Disclosing or using that confidential supporting 
information to determine whether to grant any 
application other than the application to which the 
information is related or when the minister is of the 
opinion that the disclosure or use is necessary to ensure 
public healthy and safety.  
5 years 
 





Ensuring Public Interest while granting Test-data 
Protection/Data-exclusivity  
In recent times, the idea of securing undisclosed 
data having high economic worth has gained a lot of 
momentum to be protected as undisclosed data under 
the TRIPS. Generally, this information was ensured 
protection as competitive advantages under the 
common law. 
Data-exclusivity is a transitional concept of 
protection of exclusive test data in the form of 
publicly undisclosed information which is in between 
the protection of the data in the form of trade secrets 
based on the principles of equity and good faith, and 
the domain of patent protection; which requires 
invention to be new, having an inventive step and 
capable of industrial application.29 
Before introducing to the market, the originator of 
the new drug has to invest huge amount of time and 
money to demonstrate safety and efficacy of new 
chemical entity, before the regulatory authority to 
obtain license to market the product. This is achieved 
through various test trial or clinical trials. While the 
discovery and development of another particle takes 
around 8 to 10 years and costs millions of dollars, 
creating the test information takes about half of the 
time and cost. Hence, commercial value of this data 
becomes significant at the time of acquiring 
marketing approval from administrative authority. 
This right of exclusivity is essential for brand names 
to recoup their investment. 
Data-exclusivity provides the originator with rights 
to preclude third parties from relying on the data to 
obtain marketing approval for a specific period of 
time.30 However, it does not prevent third parties from 
generating their own data. Generic manufacturers can 
also apply for marketing approval provided that they 
conduct their own tests to prove the efficacy and 
safety of their product. For example, in the US and 
Taiwan, a new molecular entity (NME) is given five 
years of date exclusivity. However, after those five 
years are up, other companies can apply for market 
approval using the same data, and thereby avoid the 
costs associated with generating their own data. 
Therefore, such data-exclusivity doesn’t ultimately 
prevent other companies from obtaining market 
approval, but it can slow them down a bit to 
incentivize the original holder.31 
The main object of granting data-exclusivity to this 
originator’s data is to incentivize new development in 
the market. As we have figured out that every such 
development requires huge R&D cost along with 
safety and efficacy trials cost, hence, the economic 
loss of such agent must be protected in terms of not 
allowing its competitors from using the same data for 
seeking approval for similar or bio equivalent drug by 
granting exclusive right to originator.  
The idea is not to give monopoly market rights but 
only to let the original player to recover the at least 
the cost. Data-exclusivity is not an extension of patent 
rights, and it does not prevent the introduction of 
generic versions of the innovative drug during the 
data-exclusivity period, as long as the marketing 
approval of the generic version does not use or rely 
upon the innovator’s test data. 
By providing a means for the innovator to 
potentially recoup the costs involved in conducting 
any locally required clinical tests for marketing 
approval and the significant costs of introducing a 
new product to the market, countries which offer data-
exclusivity are encouraging businesses to move their 
product, investment and potential manufacturing to 
their markets earlier.32 If other companies could 
immediately use these data to obtain their own 
marketing authorization, thus competing with the 
innovator, there would be less incentive for the 
innovator to invest in that market or to conduct the 
necessary trials. 
But in some sense it does create a monopoly for 
certain period and impedes the growth of Generic 
drugs in the market which has lower cost and more 
affordability particularly in developing and least 
developed countries. This is why data-exclusivity is 
controversial because it plays an important part in 
staving off competition from a generic version even if 
the patent is invalidated. In effect, data-exclusivity 
indirectly gives innovator drug companies a period of 
protection from competition.  
The cost of medicine under the Data-exclusivity 
regime tends to be very high as the companies tend to 
not only recover the cost but also pile in as much profit 
as they can. They, sometime, mark up the price of their 
product by 200%-300% as in cases as Mylan’s pricing 
of Epipen and Pfizer’s profits from Lipitor.33 Such 
situation deny the right of access to medicine to poorer 
sections of the world. Hence, the need arises to balance 
both the interest groups and harmonize incentivization 
and affordability. The economic imbalance and need 
for such safeguards on the developing countries has 
already been recognized in the Doha Declaration of 
2001. Para 4 of the Doha Declaration states that:  




“We agree that the TRIPS Agreement does not prevent 
members from taking measures to protect public 
health. Accordingly, while reiterating our commitment 
to the TRIPS Agreement, we affirm that the Agreement 
can and should be supportive of WTO Members’ right 
to protect public health and, in particular, to promote 
access to medicines for all.”34 
The Doha Declaration thus provides the flexibility 
to the norms of WTO and India has by far creatively 
interpreted these terms and utilized the flexibilities. It 
is yet to legislate on terms of data protection and 
exclusivity while such matters are generally dealt with 
some subsidiary rules and common law principles. 
Though in recent times, there is tremendous pressure 
on India by developed countries like US and EU, to 
provide such laws in their territorial market but being 
one of the largest producer of generic drug in the 
world, it must be considerate to its domestic market as 
well as the economic viability of such approach on its 
general population. Therefore, the ideal approach 
should be to introduce a fair pricing system along 
with data-exclusivity regime so that public health 
does not get impaired in the tussle between incentives 
and affordability.  
 
Indian Position 
Protection of pharmaceutical regulatory data is a 
hotly debated issue in India and despite several 
attempts; Indian government could not adopt a clear 
policy on this issue. The conflicting interests of 
generic manufacturers and multinational 
pharmaceutical industry have largely shaped this 
debate in terms of national interest and public policy 
issue. India is increasingly facing pressure from the 
USA to implement a TRIPS-plus data-exclusivity 
regime. India has conventionally maintained that its 
existing regime based upon a combination of common 
law protection of trade secrets law35 and the 
provisions of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act 1940 
(India) is sufficient to fulfil the obligation of the 1994 
TRIPS Agreement and a standalone legislative 
framework, especially the one identical to the US 
system, is not a suitable preposition. However, this 
position could not be sustained over the periods of 
time as proprietary data submitted to drug registration 
authority was virtually used by Indian generic 
manufacturers in every single case without proper 
authorization.  
The underlying logic of data-exclusivity suggests 
that it is an expression of trade-secrets, and that as 
such, data-exclusivity should be independent of 
patents; hence, in the absence of any express 
legislation, data-exclusivity is claimed as other forms 
of intellectual property. Various laws in India are as 
following- 
 
a) The Official Secrets Act, 1923  
Section 5 of the Official Secrets Act provides that 
unauthorized disclosure of official secrets is a 
punishable offence. This provision is also applicable 
to government employees. 
b) Drugs & Cosmetics Act, 1940 
Rule 53 of the Drugs and Cosmetics Rules, 1945 
provides that for restriction on the officer of 
disclosing any data received by him except in case of 
official business and court orders.  
c) The Insecticides Act, 1968  
Once the original registration is obtained by the 
originator/ first applicant u/s 9(3) of the Insecticides 
Act (1968), a large number of ‘me too’ registrations 
are obtained immediately, u/s 9(4) of the Act – 
virtually without any test data. 
Realizing the inadequacies of its current system, the 
Indian government had constituted an inter-ministerial 
committee in February 2004 to recommend appropriate 
framework for the implementation of obligation of 
Article 39.3 of the 1994 TRIPS Agreement. This 
Committee took considerable time in its deliberations 
and finally submitted its report on 31 May 2007.36 This 
Committee, which is commonly known as Satwant 
Reddy Committee, recommended separate protection 
regimes for agrochemical products, traditional 
medicines and pharmaceuticals. To protect undisclosed 
information submitted to drug regulatory authority, the 
Report recommends that: 
“There is an established system of marketing 
approval and evaluation of test data generated for 
drugs in India. While there is need to improve the 
system and make necessary legal changes and 
explicitly provide for the minimum requirements 
under Article 39.3 of TRIPS, any higher standards of 
data protection should be done after a careful study of 
its impact on the sector and public to avoid any 
adverse repercussions in the long run. India has 
adopted product patent regime with effect from 1 
January 2005, the impact of which is yet to be seen. 
Therefore, a somewhat cautious approach may be in 
the interest of the country. Any misgivings in the 
public mind about the need or the justification for the 
new system need to be addressed over a period of 




time. A calibrated approach with a transitional 
period, therefore, appears to be best suited for India. 
During the transitional period, the minimum 
requirements under Article 39.3 of TRIPS can be 
implemented. Also, this period can be utilized to 
educate the public and industry so as to allay their 
apprehensions on the issue. The capacity and the 
physical infrastructure available with the Regulatory 
Authority would need to be suitably strengthened and 
upgraded.” 
The Report clearly rejects the option of adopting a 
TRIPS-plus data-exclusivity regime and instead 
proposed an alternative model with transition 
arrangements. The compromised reached in the 
Report has some negative implication too. Ideally, 
India should adopt a more enabling data protection 
regime, which can allow generic companies to use 
proprietary data subject to payment of royalties. A 
complete restriction on the use of data, though for a 
limited period of time, would inevitably affect the 
functioning of generic companies. There are 
apprehensions that such a system would gradually 
move to a fully fledged data-exclusivity regime. This 
Report contains several important recommendations 
which have as yet not been taken up by the 
government. The initial response of the Ministry of 
Health was not welcoming on certain aspects of 
Committee's recommendation but it is recently 
reported that Ministry has now requested to the World 
Health Organization to commission a 'study on the 
impact of Satwant Reddy Committee Recommendations 
on the Indian Pharmaceutical Industry.' 37,38 
Drug manufacturers dominate Indian pharmaceutical 
sector. Not only is the initial research and development 
behind the generation of the drug expensive, but also 
an additional cost is incurred during clinical trials to 
prove the efficacy of the drug. Presence of data-
exclusivity provisions provides incentive to the drug 
manufacturers for further investments or new 
adaptations of the existing drug. Under the Indian 
Patent Act, patent qualification criteria are stringent. 
Modifications of existing drugs or improvements will 
not be eligible for patent protection. 
As stated earlier, import, export, manufacturing 
and distribution of drugs in India is regulated by The 
Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 and the Drugs and 
Cosmetics Rules,1945. According to Rule 122E of the 
Drugs and Cosmetics Rules, 1945 a new drug is 
recognized for a period of four years since the first 
approval from Indian Regulatory Authorities. The 
Central Drugs Standard Control Organization 
(CDSCO), the licensing authority, requires all new 
generic versions of the manufacture within the four 
years to be registered with it. Under the Indian legal 
regime, protection provided by the data-exclusivity 
provisions is completely different from the protection 
as provided under the patent regime. Even if a new 
drug is not patentable, it would still qualify for data-
exclusivity provisions as a “new drug” under section 
122E. Both protections are mutually exclusive for 
each other. After the end of customary four years, the 
subsequent manufacturers can seek permission from 
the central authority to rely on the existing data. The 
laws also require bioavailability and bioequivalence 
test results with existing drugs to be provided by 
generic manufacturers to secure regulatory approval. 
Such tests can be waivered in public interest. 
According to the laws in India, data with respect to 
the safety of a drug needs to be submitted in India, no 
matter the safety and efficacy has been established in 
another country. The Trade Secret protection is 
provided as a common law remedy. Other existing 
laws are The Official Secrets Act, 1923; The 
Insecticides Act, 1968 and the Indian Patents Act, 
1970. These legislations are mostly preventive in 
nature. 
 
Optimum Period for Test Data to be Reasonably 
Excluded for Generic Companies 
To decide a particular time frame for granting 
access to the data to the generic companies one must 
look at the factors of the market and role of generic 
drugs in that market. As has been discussed earlier, 
the generic drugs provide affordability of innovative 
and necessary cure to large section of poor 
population. While the big companies tend to 
concentrate on their profit motive, the poor population 
is left in astray. These generic companies cater to 
these people in need by bringing down the cost of the 
pharmaceuticals and making them feasible. Therefore 
blocking the generic companies access to such data 
not only mars the prospects of the company but also 
hinders the access to medicine to those poor. 
There are three reasons why generics have become 
a part of the global pharmaceutical industry. First, 
generics play an important role in the global 
pharmaceuticals industry. They do not just cater to the 
health needs of the poorer countries but also to kick-
start innovation in these nations. Second, historically, 
copying has been the first step for innovation even in 




the developed world. Thus for innovation in 
pharmaceuticals to proliferate all over the world, 
generics will serve as the first step to kick-start the 
industry. Especially for least-developed countries, the 
leap to innovation in pharmaceuticals in the future 
will occur only when they take the first step of being 
able to establish generic drug manufacturing facilities 
locally. Third, even in developed nations that are 
obsessed with patents, like the United States, the 
astronomical cost of medication has resulted in an 
increased appreciation for the role of generics. Thus 
generics are viewed as important components to 
enable market competition as well as to challenge bad 
patents. In all, the generic drug industry represents an 
important industry catering to the healthcare needs of 
a large segment of the global population. 39 
The time frame in the data-exclusivity regime must 
be decided upon above mentioned factors. Not only 
the incentivization and cost recovery of the data 
originator is to be considered, but also the importance 
and utility of the generic drugs in the market should 
be the factor while making a decision. Longer period 
of blockage to the test data will create more monopoly 
and lesser accessibility. 
 
Conclusion  
The issue of data-exclusivity is quite debatable as 
several issues are attached to it. These issues are 
concerned with availability of generic medicines 
especially in developing countries particularly those 
having high population of patients with HIV/AIDS. 
The debate revolves around the interpretation of 
Article 39.3 of TRIPS Agreement and whether the 
said article obliges for data-exclusivity or not.  
Countries which have a strong research based 
pharmaceutical industry believe in incentivizing the 
industry through protection in the form of data-
exclusivity. All WTO members, since January 1, 
200040 have been mandated to have provisions, which 
are TRIPS Compliant, and to enforce this provision in 
the most efficacious manner possible. The only 
exception to this mandate is the least developed 
countries. It is acknowledged that these countries  
do aim to provide such protection as required  
under TRIPS, but are unable to keep up with the 
provisions.  
India does not have any act which corresponds to 
the Hatch-Waxman Act and no legal provision which 
complies with Article 39(3)41 of the TRIPS agreement. 
The Officers Secret Act, 1923 binds public officers 
from disclosing any confidential information in a 
manner, which is not authorized. Otherwise, there  
is no statutory provision, which protects the data 
submitted to regulatory authorities for testing. 
Developed countries like U.S and EU try to enforce 
the provisions of data-exclusivity in the form of  
Free Trade Agreements (FTA’s) with developing 
countries. As a result, most developing countries have 
opted for data-exclusivity via FTA’s. We must 
question why this TRIPS-plus measure has been so 
widely adopted notwithstanding it harms access to 
medicines in developing countries. The reason is that 
it is forced upon them and they are threatened by 
developed countries due to the possibility of trade 
sanctions. 
Moreover, these developed countries are also 
seeking amendments in Indian law to introduce data-
exclusivity. As we have already discussed there are 
various reasons why data-exclusivity laws should not 
be brought into India at this stage. An analysis of 
Article 39.3 of TRIPS shows that TRIPS speaks of 
data protection in a flexible manner and does not talk 
about data-exclusivity. Thus, the argument that data-
exclusivity must be provided in India to be in 
compliance with TRIPS is fallacious. 
The pharmaceutical MNC’s demand for data-
exclusivity is clearly a TRIPS-plus demand and 
against the object and principles of the TRIPS 
Agreement. It violates the flexibilities inherent in the 
TRIPS Agreement and also against the Paragraph IV 
of Doha Declaration on Public Health, which  
clearly says the TRIPS Agreement can and should  
be interpreted and implemented in a manner 
supportive of the WTO members, right to protect 
public health and, in particular, to promote access to 
medicines for all. 
Developing countries say that the data-exclusivity 
poses a fundamental concern for access and 
affordability. For example, in case of medicines 
where the generic drug entry will be stopped as are 
result of the monopolization of the clinical trial test 
data. India is not implementing the data-exclusivity in 
pharmaceutical sectors mainly to protect the public 
health because India is considered as one of the 
largest populated country, where 60% of the people 
are suffering from some diseases and the medicines 
are not easily affordable by them. The per capita 
income of the people of India is very low; therefore, 
there is need for the market of generic drugs. The 
data-exclusivity delays the entry of generic drugs in 




the market and that is main reason of the Indian 
government for not providing data-exclusivity to the 
same. So, the decision of India of not allowing data-
exclusivity is not only TRIPS compliant but also in 
nation’s interest. It must be appreciated that we need 
not to follow precedents set by developed countries 
that are primarily based on a different societal set up 
and is guided by commercial exigencies. The larger 
interest of India requires us to stick to the obligations 
of TRIPS Agreement and not to venture into the arena 
of TRIPS-plus terrains. The TRIPS Agreement 
nowhere stipulates and obligates India to confer data-
exclusivity and the only requirement is to prevent an 
unfair commercial use of the data submitted. 
There is no doubt that expensive and extensive 
research is done to develop a new drug molecule but 
if it is not available to poor in the developing 
countries and least developed countries what would 
be the use of such research in society. There is a 
product patent in India and MNC’s can recoup the 
expenses involved in the research process during the 
term of patent. Demand for the protection of research 
data in the form of data-exclusivity does not appear to 
be genuine. 
Currently, India does not acknowledge any data-
exclusivity arrangements. It has adopted most flexible 
interpretation of Article 39.3 of TRIPS Agreement. 
The interpretation of Article 39.3 needs to be given 
with the help of maxim “expressio unis est exclusion 
alterius” which says “what is not explicitly included 
is thereby excluded”. It is said that data-exclusivity 
arrangements, whenever added to the Indian Drugs 
and Cosmetic Act, will prevent India’s drug 
regulatory agency from referencing or otherwise 
relying on registration data previously innovator drug 
companies in order to gain regulatory approval for the 
rapeutically equivalent generic versions.42 
Satwant Reddy Committee, which was formed by 
the Government of India to look into the matter, has 
made certain recommendations and safeguards in its 
report submitted in 2007. The report is yet to be 
implemented by the government. The Committee 
clearly recommended that the obligations under TRIPS 
Article 39 can be met merely by non-disclosure of the 
data submitted for marketing approval to the regulatory 
authority and also mentioned that non-disclosure did 
not necessarily preclude the reliance on that data by 
regulatory authority for approval of the same product 
by any subsequent applicant.37We think that before 
arriving at any decision, Government of India must 
consider the socio-economic conditions of India. It 
must take adequate caution in its current negotiations 
towards formation of FTA with European Union and 
USA in particular. Protection of public interest must be 
given preference as compared to the interest of MNC’s. 
Instead of introducing data-exclusivity, suitable 
legislative measures should be taken for the protection 
of data against unfair use, and this would ultimately 
resolve the ground on which MNC’s are advocating 
data-exclusivity. Therefore, until the Indian 
government reaches a stage at which data-exclusivity 
laws will be useful to the Indian Pharmaceutical sector, 
the move to amend the DCA and other laws to 
accommodate data-exclusivity should therefore be 
opposed. 
 
Balancing the Interests: Possible Solutions 
 
Compensatory Liability Approach 
This is also known as the middle road or the cost 
sharing option. Under this approach the generic 
companies who want to enter the market can rely 
upon the originator’s data if they compensate their 
investments in generating this data.43 This 
compensatory liability approach is already in effect in 
the US for protecting agricultural test data. Under this 
approach the data can be automatically used from the 
time of its submission, following payment of a 
reasonable compensation by the generic company 
wishing to enter the market. Further, bioequivalence 
can be used any time without limitations due to 
exclusivity periods. This approach is the fairest option 
for tackling the free rider problem. The generic 
company can enter the market immediately after 
patent expiration conditioned upon having proved 
bioequivalence. 
 
Automatic Waiver in Cases of Compulsory Licensing 
It is said that waiving data-exclusivity in cases of 
compulsory licensing would be favorable for 
addressing public health concerns. As explained, 
some FTA’s have laid down safeguard provisions 
pursuant to the Doha Declaration.44 However, these 
provisions were drafted broadly and did not specify a 
waving of data-exclusivity. 
Adopting the early working exception.45 Under this 
patent exception, founded on Article 30 TRIPS, 
generic pharmaceutical companies may initiate 
application procedure for obtaining marketing 
approval during the patent term. As it is aimed to 
comply with the requirements of the regulatory 




approval there is no commercial use of the patented 
invention. 
Adopting this exception would benefit generic 
pharmaceutical companies in developing countries as 
long as they would have started at an early stage their 
application procedure for obtaining marketing 
approval. Therefore, they would market their drugs 
immediately after the patent term expires because 
their market entry would not be delayed due to the 
lengthy process of marketing approval.  
 
Termination of Data-Exclusivity upon Patent Expiration46 
It has been argued that patent term extension due to 
data-exclusivity harms developing countries interests. 
Particularly, it delays generics entry. Therefore, to 
avoid patent extensions it should be considered a 
clause either for domestic law or FTA’s prohibiting 
any extra data-exclusivity period beyond the 20 year 
of patent protection.  
In a hypothetical case, if a pharmaceutical product 
enters into the market in the 16th year of patent’s life, 
having been granted the market authorization, the 
protection left under patent law would be for 4 more 
years. Nevertheless, due to data-exclusivity it could 
be extended 1 more year according to the 5 year rule 
in USA, or even longer pursuant to the 10 years rule 
in EU.47 
In majority of cases data-exclusivity runs 
simultaneous with patent term. In consequence the 
implementation of this alternative will only be 
relevant for those cases in which data-exclusivity runs 
independently. Furthermore, it does not affect 
pioneers companies interests as they still have an 
exclusivity period for recouping their R&D 
investments in generating the data. 
 
Limiting the Term of Protection 
Reducing the 5-year term of data protection could 
be less restrictive measure. In this the pioneer 
companies would argue that they are unable to recoup 
their investments during shorter periods. To this end, 
economic analysis would be required to establish the 
adequate term of protection in which both interests 
might be satisfied.43 Moreover, pharmaceutical 
companies must justify their R&D and innovation 
expenses in generating the data. Then, only in those 
cases where the amount of money is not compensated 
through patent protection, data-exclusivity protection 
might extend to 5 years, otherwise not. 
 
Limiting the Scope 
One possible limitation that might be considered as 
fair balancing of interests would be to establish data-
exclusivity only for pharmaceutical products that do 
not meet the criteria for patentability. As these would 
not benefit from a 20-year development recoupment 
period, data-exclusivity is justifiable as it would be 
their only means of protection. 
Implementing these alternatives developing 
countries would require a case by case analysis taking 
into account the cost and benefit of these opportunities. 
Among these alternatives the compensatory liability 
approach, seems the most appropriate alternative to 
balance pioneer and generic companies interests as it 
tackles the free rider problem and devoid further delays 
of generics market entry. And as FTA’s are spreading 
throughout the world, among developing countries, 
there is a clear opportunity for contemplating and 
agreeing upon alternatives means of Pharmaceutical 
test data protection. 
Standing as we are almost two decades since the 
seminal Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement 
and Public Health,1 which in itself, had been no less 
than a paradigm shift, ushering in a climate and 
indeed, an era hallmarked by significantly greater 
focus on issues related to intellectual property and 
public health, - we do need to take sober stock of 
certain facts.  
While considerable strides have been made and 
milestones achieved to help us, the global community, 
better recognise public health values whilst framing 
the intellectual property models within existing 
international trading systems (the works of the WHO 
Global Strategy and Plan of Action on Public Health, 
Innovation and Intellectual Property and the WIPO 
Development Agenda, to name a few), - nevertheless, 
major challenges continue to persist, of which, a 
prominent few happen to be: (i) overcoming key 
infectious diseases, (ii) increasing research for 
neglected diseases, (iii) combating the growing 
burden of non-communicable diseases, as well as (iv) 
other emerging public health threats and a changing 
economic climate, - the core complaints within each 
of which, can, either directly or otherwise, be traced 
right back to the “access-imbalance” issue, - 
highlighting with acute urgency, the complex and 
inextricable relationship between public health, 
innovation and trade, which demands a far more 
holistic approach in the future (involving a wide range 
of actors) than exists at the moment. 




It is self-evident, that due to these gaps in the 
ongoing discussions, the need for a more flexible, 
inclusive and holistic perspective addressing these 
practical realities has been increasingly felt. 
Policymakers, legislators and stakeholders, all need to 
be keenly aware of the potential pitfalls of proposals 
that may seem attractive on paper the National IPR 
Policy (circa 2016),48 (ii) the National Health Policy 
(circa 2017)49 and most recently, (iii) the Delhi 
Declaration (circa 2018),50 - but need to be carefully 
scrutinised, tested out and meticulously calibrated, so 
as to be rendered optimally flexible in practice.  
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